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SELF-DEPOSIT BY TRUST COMPANIES OF
FIDUCIARY FUNDS
H. B. WHITMIORE*
Trust departments of modern banks and trust companies act as
trustee, guardian, executor, administrator, escrow agent, and in many
other fiduciary capacities.' The handling of cash held by trust de-
partments acting in such capacities frequently raises two questions:
(1) May the trust department deposit this money in the corporation's
own banking department? (2) If it does so, what legal results affect
the equitable owner of the funds, the trust company, and in case of
the company's insolvency, its creditors?
I. IS SELF-DEPOSIT PERMISSIBLE?
Courts of equity have long held that a trustee may not mingle
trust funds with his own.2 He may not divest the res of the trust
while keeping it in his own hands,3 so as to change his own status
relative to the beneficiary from trustee to mere debtor.4 He may not
profit from his administration of the fiduciary dstate.5 From each of
these three closely related principles, it would naturally follow that
a bank or trust company, being a single bntity,6 should not permit
the deposit of its trust department's fiduciary funds in its own bank-
ing department. But these principles were developed in the days
when trustees were individuals, and the development of modern cor-
porate trustees has introduced factors not contemplated when the
* Senior student, School of Law, University of North Carolina.
SSMITH, TRUST COMPANIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1928) 41-43; SEARS,
TRUST COMPANY LAW (1917) 47-49; see 12 U. S. C. A. (1926) §248.2 Terre Haute Trust Co. v. Scott, 94 Ind. App. 461, 181 N. E. 369 (1932);
In re Hodges' Estate, 68 Vt. 70, 28 Atl. 663 (1894) ; see Roebuck v. National
Surety Company, 200 N. C. 196, 156 S. E. 531 (1931) ; Francy Post v. Central
Bank and Trust Co., 204 N. C. 342, 168 S. E. 532 (1933) ; Zachery v. Hood, 205
N. C. 194, 170 S. E. 641 (1933) discussed infra note 10.
3 Terre Haute Trust Co. v. Scott, supra note 2; Arnall v. Commercial Bank
of Wellsville, 45 S. W. (2d) 909 (Mo. 1933); Genesee Wesleyan Seminary v.
U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 247 N. Y. 52, 159 N. E. 720 (1928) ; West v.
Sloan, 56 N. C. 102 (1856); Flack v. Hood, 204 N. C. 337, 168 S. E. 520
(1933); note (1933) 31 MiCH. L. REv. 532.
'Tinsley v. Amos, 102 Fla. 1, 135 So. 397 (1929) ; cases supra note 3.
McGruder v. Drury, 235 U. S. 106, 35 Sup. Ct. 77, 59 L. ed. 151 (1914);
In re Hodges' Estate, supra note 2; In re Reed's Estate, 37 Wyo. 107, 259 Pac.
815 (1927).6 1n re Prudential Trust Co., 244 Mass. 64, 138 N. E. 702 (1923) ; Flack v.
Hood, supra note 3.
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rules were first formed. Although the rules have been extended to
cases where an individual trustee deposits fiduciary funds in his own
bank, 7 or in a bank which he controls,8 courts differ widely over their
extension to self-deposit by trust departments in their own banking
departments. 9 Some hold, either by equitable principles alone' 0 or
under statutes,". that such deposits are wrongful. Others on the
contrary permit such deposits,-either by statute,' 2 under which even
permitted deposits may sometimes be held wrongful unless limited to
"proper cases,"'13 by order of court upon hearing after notice to
parties in interest, 14 or upon giving of security or surety bond, 15 or
'Bookhart v. Younglove, 207 Iowa 800, 218 N. W. 533 (1928); Genesee
Wesleyan Seminary v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., supra note 3. But
see Mills v. Swearingen, 67 Texas 269, 3 S. W. 268 (1887) (funds sent to
trustee were intended for investment in trustee's own bank, hence mingling
was rightful because consented to).
I See Ottawa Banking and Trust Co. v. Crookston State Bank, 185 Minn.
22, 239 N. W. 666 (1931).
'SEARS, TRUST COMPANY LAW (1917) 64-66; note (1933) 31 MicH. L.
REv. 532.
"Terre Haute Trust Company v. Scott; Roebuck v. National Surety Co.;
Francy Post v. Central Bank & Trust Co.; Zachery v. Hood, all supra note 2;
State v. Bank of Bristol, 165 Tenn. 461, 55 S. W. (2d) 771 (1933); id., 64
S. W. (2d) 22 (1933); see St. Paul Trust Co. v. Kitson, 62 Minn. 408, 65
N. W. 74 (1885) ; Enright v. Sedalia Trust Company, 323 Mo. 1043, 20 S. W.
(2d) 517 (1929).
The Roebuck case does not make clear whether the mingling was wrongful
in itself, or because of failure to invest. As no element of Wrongful failure to
invest or presumed knowledge of insolvency appears to be considered in either
the Francy Post case or the Zachery case, both cases indicate that self-deposit
is considered wrongful per se in North Carolina.
"Leach v. Farmers Savings Bank, 205 Iowa 114, 213 N. W. 414 (1927)
and CODE OF IOWA (1931) §9290 (subject to exception of §9285) ; Morrison v.
Lawrence Trust Co., 186 N. E. 54 (Mass. 1933) and ANN. LAWs OF MASS.
(Michie, 1933) c. 172, §§54, 55; Comm. v. Tradesmen's Trust, Appeal of Ed-
munds, 250 Pa. 372, 95 Atl. 574 (1915) and PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930)
§689.
" McDonald v. Fulton, 125 Ohio St. 507, 182 N. E. 54 (1932) commented
upon (1933) 31 MIcH. L. Rnv. 532.
'In re Smith's Estate, 112 Cal. App. 680, 297 Pac. 927 (1931).
"'Andrew v. Winnebago County Bank, 208 Iowa 392, 226 N. W. 73 (1929)
and CODE OF IOWA (1931) §9285 (exception to §9290).
' Colteaux v. First Trust and Savings Bank, 52 S. D. 443, 218 N. W. 151(1928) (authority to act as fiduciary dependent on deposit of securities with
state) ; see 12 U. S. C. A. (1926) §248(k) [applied in Donnelly v. Slaughter,
168 Atl. 762 (N. J. 1933) and First National Bank v. Weaver, 225 Ala. 169,
142 So. 420 (1932)]; FLA. COmP. LAWS (Supp. 1930) §6127 [considered in
First State Trust and Savings Bank v. Therrell, 138 So. 733 (Fla. 1932)];
CoNs. LAWS OF N. Y. (Cahill, 1930) Banking Law, c. 3, §111 [considered in
In re Peoples Trust Company, 155 N. Y. Supp. 639 (1915) commented upon(1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 465]; S. C. CODE (1932) §7907 [cited in ex parte
Michie, 167 S. C. 1, 165 S. E. 359 (1932)]. See also CoNs. LA wS oF N. Y.
(Cahill, 1930) Banking Law, c. 3, §184.
Similar deposit of security is required in North Carolina by banking reg-
ulation [Order 34, Com'r of Banks, Oct. 22, 1931, Rule 4]. Although no North
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by holding the above-mentioned principles of equity imapplicable. 10
Many reasons supporting each position may be given. Against
permitting self-deposit, it is contended that the time-tested rules are
still valid, and the fact that the trustee happens to be a trust com-
pany should not change them. 1 The rules are sound as to individual
trustees, answer the proponents of self-deposit, but departmental
bank trustees are different.18 A trust company may not change its
status from trustee to debtor, or mingle trust funds with its own
Only in a very limited legal sense can funds subject to instant with-
drawal by depositors be called "its own"; and the constantly chang-
ing funds of a bank are of vastly different character from the usually
stable funds of the individual trustee.19 Though in legal contem-
plation parts of one corporate entity, the trust department and the
banking department are separate, and the deposit is not so much a
change of status in one entity as a change of ownership from one
Carolina case decides the question, cases decided elsewhere show increasing
opposition to granting security for private deposits. See note (1933) 11 N. C.
L. REv. 306. In the absence of statutory provision covering the point, an
agreement by a national bank to give security for private deposit was em-
phatically held void in Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v. Smith, 48 F. (2d) 861 (W. D.
Pa. 1931) aff'd 56 F. (2d) 799 (C. C. A. 3d, 1932) ; but since many laws ex-
plicitly require the giving of security in the case of self-deposited fiduciary
funds, the opposition to security for private deposit may well exempt this
particular class of deposits.
" Haywood v. Plant, 98 Conn. 374, 119 Atl. 341 (1923) ; Bassett v. City
Bank and Trust Co., 115 Conn. 1, 160 Atl. 60 (1932) ; Real Estate Trust Co.
v. Union Trust Co., 102 Md. 41, 61 Atl. 228 (1905) ; Ghinger v. O'Connell, 167
Atl. 184, (Md. 1933); Tucker v. New Hampshire, 69 N. H. 187, 44 At. 927
(1897) ; Reid v. Reid, 237 Pa. 176, 85 Atl. 85 (1912) ; ex parle Michie, supra
note 15. None of these cases is thoroughly satisfactory on this point. The
decision in Haywood v. Plant involved a deposit in New York, where such
deposits are permitted by statute [supra note 15]. Bassett v. City Bank and
Tucker v. New Hampshire involved savings deposits, which were already
secured by savings department assets specifically appropriated thereto under
the rigid requirements of New England laws for the investment of savings
bank deposits, so that giving a trust preference would amount to double prefer-
ence. In ex parte Michie the court cited a statute, requiring security for such
deposits, but passed after the case arose, as raising an inference that such
deposit was good without security before the statute was passed. The Vossi-
bility that the statute was simply a statutory enactment of an already existing
equitable rule against commingling was not mentioned. And although not dis-
cussed, consent might be reasonably implied, from the fact that the funds in-
volved had been deposited in the banking department by the deceased during his
lifetime, and were left undisturbed by the executor trust department except
for changing the name in which the account was held. In Ghinger v, O'Connell
and Reid v. Reid, although consent to self-deposit was not discussed, the facts
indicate a strong possibility that such consent may have been present.
"Enright v. Sedalia Trust Co., supra note 10.
's In re Smith's Estate, supra note 13.
See Commonwealth v. Tradesmen's Trust Co., Appeal of Sherwood, 250
Pa. 378, 95 Atl. 577 (1915) ; note (1930) 16 VA. L. Rxv. 392.
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entity to another.20 A trustee may not profit from the administra-
tion of the estate? But the trust department, as such, is not profiting
from the administration of the estate when it deposits funds in the
banking department. 21 The banking department may be, but the trust
department, not the banking department, is the trustee. The banking
department uses funds in its care partly to pay the cost of caring for
the funds; and to any profits remaining after customary interest22
and the banking costs as custodian are paid, the trust company,
through its banking department, is justly entitled. 28
But, it may be objected, the purpose underlying these rules is to
minimize any possibility of temptation toward self-dealing by the
trustee, detrimental to the beneficiary ;24 and if self-deposit is per-
mitted, the company will be tempted to let fiduciary funds accumulate
unduly, and remain too long on deposit, for the use and profit of its
banking department.2 5 If insolvency threatens, this temptation be-
comes far greater.26 To expect a trust company to remove fiduciary
funds from its own banking department to another depositary when
it becomes aware of its possible insolvency, as a trustee is bound to
do in diligently caring for the trust estate, is not only to drive it fur-
ther towards insolvency, but to strain the integrity of merely human
officers dangerously far. Public bank supervision has failed to pre-
vent this self-dealing, as too many recent cases show. If deposits
must be made elsewhere, the possible effect of self-interest in choos-
ing a depositary for funds is greatly lessened.
To this reasoning, proponents of self-deposit answer that the dan-
ger of self-dealing by closely supervised trust companies is far less
than the danger of self-dealing by loosely supervised individual trus-
I Haywood v. Plant; Bassett v. City Bank, both supra note 16. Contra:
Terre Haute Trust Co. v. Scott, supra note 2; Flack v. Hood, supra note 3.
The attitude of the Connecticut court is probably in part accounted for by the
very strict requirements of the Connecticut statutes concerning the segregation
and investment of savings department and trust department funds, the savings
bank and savings department requirements being so strict that savings bank or
department deposits are legal investments for trust funds.
' Real Estate Trust Co. v. Union Trust Co., supra note 16.
'Under 48 STAT. 181, 12 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1933) §371a, with certain ex-
ceptions which do not include fiduciary deposits, interest on commercial de-
mand deposits may no longer be paid.
Haywvood v. Plant, supra note 16.
In re Hodges' Estate, supra note 2; In re Reed's Estate, supra note 5.
See St. Paul Trust Company v. Kitson, supra note 10; note (1933) 31
MicH. L. Rrv. 532.
21See (1923) 23 COL. L. Rxv. 465; note (1933) 31 MxcxI. L. Rzv. 532 (sug-
gesting in effect that such a deposit might well constitute a trust ex maleficio
.in the event of insolvency, on the basis of presumed knowledge of the in-
solvency).
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tees. There is a natural and intrinsic difference between departmental
bank trustees, and other trustees.27 Banking law requirements as to
capital, surplus, reserves, securities, inspection, and the like, surround
the former with safeguards not applied to trustees generally. 28 The
close supervision of trust companies by federal and state banking
authorities diminishes the danger of detriment to beneficiaries through
self-deposit, even though not wholly preventing it. Proper super-
vision will make negligible the danger of profit through unduly large
cash accumulations; and the deposit of security limits the danger of
loss through insolvency. 29 Mutual back-scratching agreements be-
tween separate trust companies are not unknown; so even depositing
elsewhere may not eliminate self-interest.
Another objection to self-deposit is that, in case of the insolvency
of the depositary, the beneficiary has only one possible source of
restoration, namely the insolvent company; whereas if outside deposit
were required, the beneficiary would have two possible sources, a
right against the insolvent depositary, and a right against the solvent
trustee for negligent choosing of the depositary.80 If the beneficiary
is given only a general depositor's claim,8 1 or a creditor's claim for
wrongful conversion, 32 his estate may be badly damaged through the
greater opportunity for self-dealing which self-deposit has created ;83
while if he is given a preferred status, the general depositors are
harmed to the extent of the beneficiary's gain, and this although
' In re Smith's Estate, supra note 13; ex parte Michie, supra note 15.
-' In re Smith's Estate, supra note 13.
2 See statutes cited supra note 15, specifying how such security is to be
used in case of insolvency.
o See note (1933) 31 MIcH. L. REv. 532.
' Fulton v. McDonald, supra note 12; Ghinger v. O'Connell; Reid v. Reid,
both supra note 16.
' First and Citizens National Bank v. Corporation Commission, 201 N. C.
381, 160 S. E. 360 (1931) (commingling held wrongful, but preference or right
to trace denied largely on the basis of Commonwealth v. Tradesmen's Trust
Co., Appeal of Sherwood, supra note 19. The later case of Cameron v. Car-
negie Trust Co., 292 Pa. 114, 140 A. 771 (1928) allowing a preference for
funds wrongfully commingled, was distinguished by the Pennsylvania court
from the Tradesmen's Trust case on the ground that the trust company in that
case had a right to hold the funds, apparently meaning that the commingling
was rightful; an entirely different situation from the First and Citizens Na-
tional Bank case) ; Hicks v. Corporation Commission, 201 N. C. 819, 161 S. E.
545 (1931); In re Garner Banking and Trust Company, 204 N. C. 791, 168
S. E. 813 (1933); see Madison Trust Company v. Carnegie Trust Company,
152 N. Y. Supp-. 517 (1915) aff'd,215 N. Y. 475, 109 N. E. 580 (1916).
' In banks which avail themselves of the deposit insurance now provided
[48 STAT. 168 (1933), 12 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1933) §264] amounts within the
insured limits will be fully protected.
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themselves without fault.34 Requiring deposit of security to cover
all fiduciary funds deposited in the company's own banking depart-
ment answers this objection, giving the beneficiary full protection
while saving all other assets for the protection of the general cred-
itors.;3 5 But, reply the objectors, the granting of a preferred posi-
tion to deposits by the trust department is unfair to deposits by
outside fiduciaries, which receive only general creditor claims upon
insolvency.3 6 Should not all fiduciary funds be treated alike, who-
ever deposits them?37 If the preferential status is granted on the
ground of possible greater danger through self-dealing at the ben-
eficiary's expense, is not this itself an admission of the wrongfulness
of the deposit?
Strongest arguments for permitting self-deposit are the practical
ones of custom, convenience, and frequently the intent of the person
or court appointing the fiduciary.38 It appears that self-deposit has
been accepted practice in many states3 9 Deposits in a trust com-
pany's own banking department are most convenient, especially in
small communities where there is only one baik. And when that de-
partment is approved by the public banking supervisor for deposit
of trust funds by outsiders, why should not the trust company's own
trust funds, held by its own trust department, likewise be deposited
", See note (1933) 31 MIcH. L. RE'v. 532, 539. But see Morrison v. Law-
rence Trust Co., spra note 11; Glidden v. Gutelius, 96 Fla. 834, 119 So. 140
(1929) (general depositors not unduly harmed, since they know, or should
know, that assets of the trust department are not available to commercial de-
positors, and if wrongfully commingled with commercial department assets
must be returned).
But see note (1933) 11 N. C. L. REv. 306, questioning advisability of per-
mitting secured deposits. Deposit insurance [supra note 33] wherever in force,
eliminates any necessity for securing deposits below the insured limit.
I Paul v. Draper, 158 Mo. 197, 59 S. W. 77 (1900); First and Citizens
National Bank v. Corporation Commission, supra note 32; note (1924) 37
A. L. R. 120.
0 Terre Haute Trust Co. v. Scott [supra note 21, questions whether such
discrimination between corporate trustees and individual trustees would be
constitutional, but In re Smith's Estate [supra note 13] holds such a classifi-
cation reasonable, and therefore constitutional. The South Carolina statute
[supra note 15] apparently requires the setting aside of security for fiduciary
funds awaiting investment or distribution not only if such funds have been
deposited in its own bank, but also if deposited in any other bank. The reason-
ableness and constitutionality of the last provision, distinguishing between a
corporate outside depositor, 'and an individual outside depositor, is open to
doubt. A similar provision of N. C. Rule 4 [supra note 15] is equally ques-
tionable.
I First National Bank v. Weaver, supra note 15; note (1930) 16 VA. L.
REV. 392.
See In re People's Trust Co.; First National Bank v. Weaver, both supra
note 15; eases supra note 16.
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there? 40 If the person or court appointing the fiduciary intended
that funds on hand should be deposited in the banking department,
such deposit is not considered wrongful ;41 and if, as seems probable,
the choice of fiduciary is made ordinarily on its strength as a whole,
rather than on the strength of the trust department, the presumption
of intent to permit self-deposit seems almost strong enough to be
given legal recognition.42
II. WHAT ARE THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF SELF-DEPOSIT
BY TRUST COMPANIES?
Two types of cases have raised the question of self-deposit by
trust companies. The first concerns the amount to be paid the
fiduciary estate by the banking department, for the use of funds de-
posited there.43 Some states have held, with the aid of statutes
which permit self-deposit,44 or without such aid,4" that the estate is
entitled to receive only the customary rate paid on deposits of similar
amount. The fact that the unrelated positions of executor and de-
positary are united in one corporation is merely occasion to "make the
executors and the court particularly solicitous concerning the finan-
cial responsibility of this custodian and executor, and also concerning
the amount paid for use of the deposit." 40 Others have clung to the
equitable principle that all trustees who use fiduciary funds for their
own private purpose are liable for profits made, or for interest at the
I In re People's Trust Co., supra note 15; Haywood v. Plant, supra note 16.
"Worcester Bank and Trust Co. v. Nordblom, 188 N. E. 492 (Mass. 1933)
(self-deposit held rightful where permitted by terms of trust indenture, even
where the statute provided that fiduciary funds should be held special deposits
and not commingled for use in the bank's own business) ; Mills v. Swearingen,
supra note 7; see In re Bank of Clinton, 205 N. C. 399, 171 S. E. 364 (1933) ;
Genesee Wesleyan Seminary v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., supra note 3.
'First National Bank v. Weaver, supra note 15; see (1923) 23 COL. . L.
REV. 465; (1930) 16 VA. L. Rv. 392; (1931) 44 HARv. L. Rnv. 1281, n. 49.
"See SEARs, TRUST COMPANY LAW (1917) 64-66; (1931) 44 HARv. L. REv.
1281, 1284.
"First National Bank v. Weaver, supra note 15 (where the bank under a
testamentary trust provided security for self-deposited funds as required by
the Federal Reserve Act [supra note 15], "It would be bordering on the absurd
to assume that the settlor understood that the bank, in order to be relieved
from interest charge and the. risk of removal, must abandon its own facilities
for handling the funds and deposit in s6me other institution, or hoard the
same") ; In re Smith's estate, supra note 13; Haywood v. Plant, supra note 16;
In re People's Trust Co., supra note 15.
"Real Estate Trust Co. v. Union Trust Co.; Ghinger v. O'Connell; Reid
v. Reid, all juprc note 16.
" Haywood v. Plant, supra note 16.
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legal rate.47 On the basis of these cases, a trust company would be
liable to the fiduciary estate, in case of self-deposit in jurisdictions
where self-deposit is permitted, only for the highest interest custom-
arily paid on deposits of similar size and duration; but where self-
deposit is held wrongful, the trustee is liable either for actual profits
made, or for the full legal rate of interest.
The second type of case arises from the insolvency of the trust
company. Where self-deposit is rightful, whether by consent, by
statute, or otherwise, the funds deposited in the banking department
by the trust department, like the deposits of outside fiduciaries, are
given the status of general depositors' claims, 48 receiving no pre-
ferred status unless a statute gives them either priority49 or a lien
on special security,5 0 or unless, by reason of express trust,5 1 con-
structive trust, or trust ex Maleficio,5 2 the beneficiary can trace the
specific fund into the hands of the receiver of the insolvent trust
company.
5 3
' Enright v. Sedalia Trust Co.; St. Paul Trust Co. v. Kitson, both supra
note 10; Union Trust Co. v. Preston National Bank, 144 Mich. 106, 107 N. W.
1109 (1906); see In re Reed's Estate, snpra note 5; PERRY oN TRUSTS (6th
ed.) §468.
,' Bassett v. City Bank, supra note 16; Worcester Bank and Trust Co. v.
Nordblom, supra note 41; Tucker v. New Hampshire, rupra note 16; McDon-
ald v. Fulton, supra note 12; Commonwealth v. Tradesmen's Trust Co., Appeal
of Sherwood, supra note 19, and comment thereon, supra note 32; ex parte
Michie, supra note 15.
" CoNs. LAws OF N. Y. (Cahill, 1930) Banking Law, c. 3, §188(8).
' People v. California Safe Deposit Co., 23 Cal. App. 69, 133 Pac. 324
(1913) ; Donnelly v. Slaughter, supra note 15.
' See McDonald v. Fulton, supra note 12; Commonwealth v. Tradesmen's
Trust Co., Appeal of Sherwood, supra note 19. In both of these cases, the
right to trace being unavailing because of an interpretation of the right to
trace denying the right to follow the fund where it was mingled with other
funds, the cestui que trust was relegated to a creditor's claim; see infra note 63.
' Strauss v. U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 63 F. (2d) 174 (1933) cert.
den'd., 249 U. S. 747, 53 Sup. Ct. 690, 77 L. ed. 1492 (Even where self-deposit
is permitted, a constructive or ex maleficio trust may arise through wrongful
failure to invest) ; ex parte Michie, supra note 15 (self-deposit per se, being
rightful, raises neither constructive trust nor trust ex maleficio) ; see Colteaux
v. First Trust and Savings Bank, supra note 15.
The "right to trace" originally was in rem, based solely on the beneficiary's
title to the res, and applied only so long as the specific property involved could
be followed. This rule was broadened with regard to money by In re Hallett's
Estate, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 696 (1878) to allow recovery of the full amount from
any fund with which the specific funds sought had been commingled, and has
been further broadened by a number of recent decisions, until now, in a few
jurisdictions, a showing that an insolvent estate was increased by the res in-
volved will support a right to trace the res "in the same or substituted form"
into the general assets of the estate, amounting in actual effect to an equitable
preference. See Flack v. Hood, supra note 3. Concerning the right to trace,
see (1926) 26 CoL. L. REv. 730; (1932) 30 Micn. L. REv. 441; (1930) 16 VA.
L. REv. 392; notes: (1925) 37 A. L. R. 120; (1928) 53 A. L. R. 564; (1933)
82 A. L. R. 730.
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Where there has been a definite intent that the funds are not to be
mingled with the banking department assets, as in case of bailments,
special deposits, and specific purpose deposits, 54 or where self-deposit
is held wrongful, either in equity or by statute or because of viola-
tion of the statutory conditions under which it is permitted, the
beneficiary's claim is variously treated either as: (1) a general cred-
itor's claim for wrongful conversion ;55 (2) a right to trace; 6 or (3)
an equitable or statutory preference.u In North Carolina, this variety
of treatment appears even between different fiduciary relationships,
which ordinarily are treated alike. Deposits made for a specific pur-
pose are given a preference, as are funds held under express trust.5 8
But ftinds held by the fiduciary in the capacity of guardian or ex-
ecutor have ben given only the standing of general creditors' claims
for wrongful conversion.5 9 Such funds are clearly more analogous
'Morrison v. Lawrence Trust Co., supra note 11 (trust funds made special
deposits by statute, ANN. LAWS OF MAss. (Michie, 1933), c. 172, §54) ; Parker
v. Central Bank and Trust Co., 202 N. C. 230, 162 S. E. 564 (1932) com-
mented upon (1932) 10 N. C. L. REv. 381; First and Citizens National Bank
v. Corporation Commission; Hicks v. Corporation Commission; In re Garner
Banking and Trust Co., all supra note 32.
'First and Citizens National Bank v. Corporation Commission; Hicks v.
Corporation Commission;'In re Garner Banking and Trust Co., all supra
note 32.
' First State Trust and Savings Bank v. Therrell, supra note 15; Terre
Haute Trust Co. v. Scott, supra note 2; Leach v. Farmers Savings Bank,
supra note 10; Donnelly v. Slaughter, supra note 15; Madison Trust Co. v.
Carnegie Trust Co., supra note 32; Flack v. Hood, supra note 3; Common-
wealth v. Tradesmen's Trust Co., Appeal of Edmunds, supra note 11; Colteaux
v. First Trust and Savings Bank, supra note 15; State v. Bank of Bristol,
supra note 10.
Morrison v. Lawrence Trust Co., supra note 11; Andrew v. Winnebago
County Bank, supra note 14. Where the right to trace is interpreted to reach
into the entire general assets, as in Flack v. Hood [supra note 3], the right to
trace and the right to an equitable preference arrive at identical results, fre-
quently causing a confusion in the terms.
' Parker v. Central Bank and Trust Co., 202 N. C. 230, 162 S. E. 564
(1932) ; Flack v. Hood, supra note 3; Francy Post v. Central Bank & Trust
Co. and Zachery v. Hood, both supra note 2. The phrase "express trust" does
not appear, the decisions being based on "deposit for a specific purpose." The
Parker case, involving escrow funds, is clearly within this terminology. Flack
v. Hood, involving funds paid on a note held by the trust company as trustee
under a security trust deed, could be supported on either a "specific purpose"
or an express trust theory. In the Francy Post case (memorandum decision-
facts at p. 32 of record) the funds involved were part of a management trust,
had been received from payment of bonds at maturity, and were awaiting re-
investment when the bank closed seven days after the funds were received. No
deposit for a specific purpose was involved, unless in the broad sense that all
fiduciary funds might be considered.
I Hicks v. Corporation Commission; In re Garner Banking and Trust Co.,
both supra note 32. Since the trust department in these cases and in Zachery
v. Hood [supra note 2] held its fiduciary position under the jurisdiction of the
court and was under a duty to pay out funds as needed, the last seems dis-
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to funds held for a specific purpose or under express trust, than to
funds on general deposit ;6o and much authority, so regarding them,
holds that the guardian or executor has neither right nor power to
convert the fiduciary funds into a mere creditor's lien for wrongful
conversion, so long as any funds or property remain in the trustee's
possession into which the beneficiary, by virtue of his right of prop-
erty, can trace the funds in the same or substituted form, or to which
he can claim equitable preference.61
A North Carolina case cites the rule that guardian or other
fiduciary funds on general deposit become only creditor's claims like
other general deposits upon insolvency of a depositary, and reconciles
it with the rule against commingling by holding in effect that the con-
structive trust claim is converted into a creditor's lien by the trustee's
own wrongdoing.6 2 The effort to reconcile the two rules seems un-
necessary. The cases cited there in support of the prior -rule dealt with
deposits by outsiders, where no rule against commingling was in-
volved. A recent Tennessee decision, involving funds commingled
by self-deposit, altered the previous rule regarding the right to trace
in that state, and held that, such commingling being a breach of trust,
a broader right to trace must be awarded, because the trustee cannot
be permitted to deprive the beneficiary of the funds by his own
wrongdoing, so long as funds can be reached in the insolvent's es-
tate.63 Consistency in the North Carolina cases, which use language
tinguishable from the first two only on the narrow technicality that the funds
came to the hands of the trust company through a judgment, rather than from
the estate of a person deceased. If the last comes fairly within the "specific
purpose" rule, should not the first two also?
" See First State Bank and Trust Co. v. Therrell, supra note 15 ("court
trusts, such as guardianships, administratorships, executorships, corporate
trusts, escrows, and other miscellaneous trusts" held to be "of equal and like
dignity") ; In re Hallett's Estate, upra note 53, at 709-710 (with regard to
"an express trustee, or an agent, or a bailee, or a collector of funds, or any-
body else in a fiduciary position . . . the moment you establish the fiduciary
relation, the modern rules of equity, as regards following trust money, apply") ;
Leach v. Farmers Savings Bank, supra note 11; 12 U. S. C. A. (1926) §248 ff.
Gt Tinsley v. Amos, supra note 4; Leach v. Farmers Savings Bank, supra
note 11; Terre Haute Trust Co. v. Scott, supra note 7; Rottger v. First Mer-
chants Bank of Lafayette, 184 N. E. 267 (Ind. App. 1933) (beneficiary is en-
titled to preference not because of a wrongful conversion, but because of his
right of property in the fund) ; Morrison v. Lawrence Trust Co., supra note
11; State v. Bank of Bristol, supra note 10; In re Hallett's Estate, supra
note 53.
" Roebuck v. National Surety Co., supra note 2; see First and Citizens
National Bank v. Corporation Commission, and comment, supra note 32.
" State v. Bank of Bristol, supra note 10. The Pennsylvania case of Cam-
eron v. Carnegie Trust Co., supra note 32, adopts the modern rule of allowing
tracing into a commingled fund, distinguishing the case from Appeal of Sher-
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practically' identical with that of the Tennessee courts, in the case of
express trust and specific purpose deposits, 4 suggests that a like
preference should be granted to self-deposited guardian and executor
funds.65 This inconsistency of legal effect in the North Carolina
cases is undoubtedly due in large measure to the ever present diffi-
culty in balancing equities between the cestui que trust of an in-
solvent trustee and his general creditors,6 6 to the recent increasing
support given to the modern liberal attitude as to tracing and pre-
serving beneficiary rights, and possibly to the fact that in the guardian
cases, the party seeking to establish a preference was not the ben-
eficiary, but the bonding company for the insolvent bank; but a lack
of full recognition of the character and dangers of self-deposit seems
also a factor in the guardian and executor cases.
The foregoing paragraphs indicate the impossibility of giving any
categorical answer to the two questions considered. The proven dan-
gers of self-dealing suggest that where neither segregated security nor
a thoroughly adequate system of bank supervision is available for the
protection of beneficiaries, self-deposit should be forbidden to depart-
mental bank trustees as it is to individual trustees. Such a rule
would result in much inconvenience, however, and possibly the unde-
sirable sterilization of currency by removal from circulation into lock-
boxes and bank vaults.
Is there a plan permitting self-deposit which overcomes these ob-
jections, yet protects beneficiaries from the danger of self-dealing by
the trustee, and preserves general assets of an insolvent company for
the depositors and other general creditors?
Possibly a thoroughly adequate system of bank supervision would
justify permitting self-deposit on a general deposit basis, the fiduciary
funds taking only a general deposit status, without security of any
kind. To deposits which may hereafter be covered by deposit insur-
ance, this plan would obviously give full protection.
wood [supra note 19], but apparently overruling sub silentio the narrower
right to trace allowed in the Appeal of Edmunds case [supra note 11], since
funds -were wrongfully commingled in both the Cameron and the Edmunds
cases.
I Flack v. Hood, supra note 3 ("A corporate fiduciary will not be permitted
to escape the responsibilities arising from such status by the simple expedient
of self-dealing.").
I See discussion of North Carolina situation, supra note 15.
"Ex parte Michie, supra note 15, at 364; (1932) 30 Micu. L. Rzv. 441;
note (1933) YALE L. J. 1125. Where equities are so evenly balanced, and so
difficult to determine, foreknowledge through the certainty of statutory pro-
visions facilitates an equitable adjustment of rights.
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Under present conditions, however, a plan permitting such self-
deposit upon the setting aside of adequate security, and granting the
self-deposited funds a lien or preferred claim to the proceeds of these
securities in case the trust company becomes insolvent, would seem
to give maximum protection and convenience to all parties involved.
In states where legislation regarding self-deposit is lacking, it is be-
lieved that the position of all parties would be improved and clarified
by the enactment of such a plan into law. 67
'It is believed that the safety of beneficiaries and general depositors as
well as the convenience of trust companies, would be served by the enactment
of a statute having the following fundamental provisions:
(1) Authorization of trust company to act as fiduciary only upon proof of
adequate solvency and/or deposit of securities with the state.
(2) Segregation of all trust department accounts, and of property held, in
cash or otherwise, such property not to be mingled with the money or other
property of the company except as hereafter provided.
(3) Permission for deposit of fiduciary funds held by trust department in
commercial department of the same company, only upon giving of adequate
approved security by the commercial department to the trust department.
(4) Application, in the event of insolvency, of all trust department assets
to trust accounts, together with a first lien on securities given under (3), and
a preference against the general assets of the company in the event of failure
to set aside securities as required, to the extent of full satisfaction of all
beneficiaries' rights.
Upon adoption of similar provisions regarding savings department deposits
and assets, such as those of Connecticut, deposit in savings department of trust
funds might be safely permitted without further security.
